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Non-intersection of appropriately defined Generalized Lorenz (GL) curves is equivalent to a unani-
mous ranking of distributions of ordinal data by all Cowell and Flachaire (Economica, 2017) indices of 
inequality and by a new index based on GL curve areas. Comparisons of life satisfaction distributions 
for six countries reveal a substantial number of unanimous rankings. The GL dominance criteria are 
compared with other criteria including the dual-H dominance criteria of Gravel, Magdalou, and Moyes 
(Economic Theory, 2020).
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1. introduction
Cowell and Flachaire (2017) provide an approach to measuring inequality of 
ordinal data such as life satisfaction, happiness, and self-assessed health status that 
differs significantly from the approach taken in most recent research. This paper 
builds on Cowell and Flachaire’s work by adding dominance results and a new 
inequality index, illustrates them using cross-national data about life satisfaction 
distributions, and compares the approach with others.
Since the critique by Allison and Foster (2004), most economists have accepted 
that it is inappropriate to assess ordinal data inequality using the tools developed 
to assess the inequality of cardinal data on income and wealth. The latter methods 
associate greater inequality with greater dispersion about the mean, but the mean 
is an improper benchmark for an ordinal variable. For ordinal variables, Allison 
and Foster (2004) propose instead that greater inequality means greater spread 
about the median and they demonstrate that, for distributions with the same 
median, a unanimous ordering by all indices incorporating this concept is equiva-
lent to “S-dominance”—a particular configuration of cumulative distribution 
functions.1 Allison and Foster (2004) and other researchers, including Abul Naga 
1See also Kobus (2015) for characterization results.
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and Yalcin (2008) and Apouey (2007), have developed inequality indices consistent 
with S-dominance. A distinguishing feature of the Allison-Foster approach is that 
it measures inequality in terms of polarization: “inequality” is maximized when 
half  the population has the lowest value on the ordinal scale and half  the popula-
tion has the largest value. Cowell and Flachaire’s (2017) inequality indices are dif-
ferent because greater inequality reflects greater spread in a sense other than greater 
polarization. However, no dominance results currently exist for Cowell-Flachaire 
indices.
I show that non-intersection of appropriately defined Generalized Lorenz 
(GL) curves is equivalent to a unanimous ranking of distributions by all Cowell 
and Flachaire (2017) indices of inequality and by a new index based on areas below 
GL curves. The results are not restricted to distributions with the same median. 
Comparisons of life satisfaction distributions for six countries derived from World 
Values Survey data show that the new dominance results reveal a substantial num-
ber of unanimous inequality rankings.
I use Cowell and Flachaire’s “peer-inclusive downward-looking” definition of 
individual status (explained below) because this definition is consistent with the 
focus in the median-related inequality measurement literature. (Cumulative distri-
bution functions are the building blocks in common.) There are analogous results 
for Cowell and Flachaire’s “peer-inclusive upward-looking” status definition but, 
for brevity, I summarize these in the Appendix.2
I also demonstrate that rankings according to the GL criteria differ from 
rankings according to the dual H-dominance results of Gravel et al. (2020) based 
on the concept of Hammond transfers. I compare the elementary transformations 
that underlie each approach and provide empirical illustrations of how they order 
World Values Survey life satisfaction distributions differently.
Various supplementary materials cited in the main text are reported in the 
Appendix.
2. cowell-Flachaire inequality indiceS For ordinal data
The well-being of each of N individuals is measured on an ordinal scale char-
acterized by a set of numerical labels (l1, l2, …, lK), with –∞ < l1 < l2 < … < lK < 
∞, and K ≥ 3. Thus, the distribution of well-being is summarized by an ordered 
categorical variable. The proportion of individuals in the kth category is denoted 
fk with 0 ≤ fk ≤ 1 and 
∑K
k= 1
fk=1. The proportion of individuals in the kth category 




Cowell and Flachaire (2017) propose a two-step approach to inequality mea-
surement for ordinal data. First, decide how to summarize “status,” si, for each 
individual i = 1, 2, 3, …, N. In particular, Cowell and Flachaire’s “peer-inclusive 
downward-looking” status of an individual with scale level k is Fk, and hence does 
not depend on the specific values attached to (l1, l2, …, lK). That is, the measure is 
scale independent.
2No researchers have used Cowell and Flachaire’s (2017) “peer-exclusive” definitions in applied 
work, not even the authors themselves.
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Second, define inequality as an aggregate summary of the “distances” between 
each person’s status and an appropriate common reference value. A shortening of 
the distances means less inequality. Cowell and Flachaire argue persuasively that 
the common reference status value for a peer-inclusive status measure should be 
the maximum value, that is, 1 (the maximum of Fk). With some auxiliary axioms 
including a requirement that the minimum value of the inequality index is 0 (when 
all individuals are in the same category), Cowell and Flachaire (2017) characterize 
a one-parameter family of inequality indices, I(α), with 0 ≤ α < 1:
The smaller that α is, the greater the weight that is put on small status values 
relative to high status values. Cowell and Flachaire also cite a closely related class 
of “Atkinson-like” indices, A(α):
A(α) equals one minus the generalized mean of order α of  status, and is a 
monotonically increasing transformation of the corresponding I(α) index.3
Let D(s) denote an index that is a monotonically decreasing Schur-convex 
function of the distribution of status s, and  denote the set of all such functions. 
Clearly, every I(α) and A(α) index belongs to . Also consider the class of indices 
W(s) = G(D(s)) where G(.) is a monotonically decreasing function. W(s) is of a sim-
ilar form to the social evaluation functions commonly used in income distribution 
analysis: it is a monotonically increasing Schur-concave function of individual sta-
tus (Marshall et al., 2011, Table 1, case xii). Let  denote the set of monotonically 
increasing Schur-concave social evaluation functions. Indices E(α)  =  1  −  A(α), 
0 ≤ α < 1, are examples of members of .
The next section presents a tractable method based on Generalized Lorenz 
curve comparisons for assessing whether one distribution of status is unambig-
uously more (un)equal than another according to all indices belonging to classes 









































3Because every individual that provides the same response on the scale has the same status, the 
index expressions (1) and (2) can also be expressed in terms of sums over scale levels rather than sums 
(or products) over individuals. See Cowell and Flachaire (2017, eqn. 21) and Section 5 below.
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3. Generalized lorenz curveS For diStributionS oF (peer-incluSive) StatuS, 
and an inequality dominance reSult
I define the Generalized Lorenz (GL) curve for the distribution of status, 
GL(s, p) given 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, following Shorrocks (1983) closely. With the elements of 
the distribution of status placed in ascending order, that is, s1 ≤ s2 ≤ s3 ≤ … ≤ sN, we 
have:
The GL curve is drawn using straight lines to connect adjacent points of the 
form {m/N, GL(s,  m/N)}. The vertices of the curve are at {p0  =  0, 0} and {pk, ∑k
j= 1
fjFj} for each k = 1, …, K with pk = Fk. The GL ordinate at p = 1 is the 
arithmetic mean of the status distribution (with a limiting value of 0.5 as K → ∞). 
Figure 1 provides an illustrative example for the case K = 4.
The 45° ray from (0, 0) to (1, 1) is the GL curve representing complete 
 equality—when all individuals have the same scale value and hence the same sta-
tus. With inequality, the GL curve lies below the 45° ray and, intuitively, the further 
below the ray the curve is, the greater is inequality.
One can demonstrate that a unanimous ranking of a pair of distributions in 
terms of their equality (or inequality) is equivalent to the non-crossing of their GL 
curves:
Result 1: For two status distributions s and s′, W(s) ≥ W(s′) for all 
W(.) ∈  iff  GL(s, p) ≥ GL(s′, p) for all p.
Result 2: D(s) ≤ D(s′) for all D(.) ∈ D iff  GL(s, p) ≥ GL(s′, p) for all p.
Result 1 follows directly from Shorrocks (1983, Theorem 2). Result 2 follows from 












si,m=1,…,N, andGL (s, 0)=0.
TABLE 1  
croSS-national compariSonS oF liFe SatiSFaction diStributionS: Summary oF F- and  
Gl-dominance checkS
Country y
AU CA GB NZ US ZA
AU < < < – –
CA – – –* > –
Country GB > – – > –
x NZ – < < > >
US – – – – –
ZA < < < < <
Notes: Entries above the diagonal summarize checks for F-dominance (first-order dominance): 
“>”, x F-dominates y; “<”, y F-dominates x; “–”, no dominance. *: NZ S-dominates CA. Entries below 
the diagonal summarize GL dominance checks: “>”, x is more equal than y; “<”, y is more equal than 
x; “–”, no dominance.
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The connection between GL curve location and inequality suggests a new index 
of inequality for ordinal data, J. With reference to Figure 1, J is the ratio of area 
A to area A + B; equivalently, J equals 1 minus twice area B. It is Generalized 
Lorenz-consistent because a ranking of a pair of distributions by J is the same 
as the ranking by all D(.) ∈  when the two GL curves do not cross. Using the 
expression for the vertices of the GL curve, and applying the Trapezium Formula, 
one can show that:
The minimum value of J is 0, achieved when there is perfect equality.
The dominance results relate to GL curves, not to Lorenz curves as some read-
ers might expect. The reason is that the mean of the category labels is an inap-
propriate reference point (Allison and Foster, 2004), and hence also shares of the 
(labels) total are not a suitable building-block for inequality measurement in this 
context. Differences between observed status and a common status reference value 
are what matter for Cowell-Flachaire indices. (I return to this issue in Section 5.)
The situation considered here has analogies with the measurement of pov-
erty. Non-intersection of two Three Is of Poverty (TIP) curves is equivalent to 
a unanimous ranking according to all “generalized poverty gap” poverty indices 
(Jenkins and Lambert, 1997). But a TIP curve shows, at each p, the vertical dis-
tance between two GL curves, one for the distribution of income censored above 
at the poverty line and the other for the distribution in which every income equals 

















Figure 1. A Generalized Lorenz (GL) Curve for the Distribution of Status (K = 4) 
Note: Area-based inequality index J = A/(A + B) = 1 – 2B.
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between two GL curves, is analogous to the Shorrocks (1995) modified-Sen pov-
erty index (which equals twice the area beneath a TIP curve, that is, twice the area 
between two GL curves).
Polarized distributions and uniform distributions provide potential maximum- 
inequality benchmarks for ordinal data. As mentioned earlier, inequality indices in 
the Allison-Foster (2004) tradition reach their maximum if the distribution is polar-
ized. But do Cowell-Flachaire indices reach a maximum in this case, and what if the 
distribution is uniform?
Results 1 and 2 imply that inequality is greater for a uniform distribution than 
for a polarized distribution according to J and all D(.) ∈ .4 With a polarized dis-
tribution, N/2 individuals have the minimum scale value (status F1 = 0.5) and N/2 
have the maximum value (FK = 1) for all possible K. The corresponding GL curve 
has two segments connecting points {(0, 0), (0.5, 0.25), (1, 0.75)}. In contrast, with 
a uniform distribution, fk = 1/K, all k = 1, …, K, and the GL curve has vertices at 
{k/K, k(k  +  1)/(2K2)} for each k. Exploiting the expression for a straight line 
between two points, one can show that the GL curve for the polarized distribution 
lies above the curve for a uniform distribution at all p and regardless of the value 
of K.5 For example, to three decimal places (d.p.), J = 0.375 for a polarized distri-
bution and for a uniform distribution, J = 0.481 if  K = 3, 0.531 if  K = 4, and 0.615 
if  K = 10. I(0) = 0.347 for a polarized distribution and, for a uniform distribution, 
I(0) = 0.501 if  K = 3, 0.592 if  K = 4, and 0.807 if  K = 10.
Results 1 and 2 are also informative about whether J and all D(.) ∈  reach 
their maximum values in the case of a uniform distribution. One can show that, 
if  one starts from a uniform distribution and shifts a small number of individuals 
from one scale level to the next level up (or down), the pre- and post-shift GL 
curves intersect. Hence the non-uniform distribution may have greater inequality 
than the uniform distribution according to some Cowell-Flachaire indices. I pro-
vide a numerical illustration of this in Section 5.
4. empirical illuStration: rankinG countrieS by liFe SatiSFaction 
inequality
To illustrate the analysis, I use data about life satisfaction from the mid-2000s 
for six countries (Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, USA, 
South Africa), drawn from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), the 
latest available when this research was undertaken. The six countries are “white 
settler” economies plus their colonial mother country (Great Britain).6 Life satis-
faction is measured using a 10-point integer-valued scale ranging from 1 
4The results cited in this paragraph require that N is sufficiently large so that any difference in the 
number of individuals in each category is negligible, with attention restricted to the two populated 
categories in the case of a polarized distribution.
5Similarly, one can also show that the GL curve for a uniform distribution over K + 1 levels lies 
everywhere on or below the GL curve for a uniform distribution over K levels. Illustrating these results, 
Appendix Figure A1 shows Generalized Lorenz curves for a polarized distribution and uniform distri-
butions with K = 3, 4, 5, and 10.
6Ireland could be included in this description but there are no Irish data in the WVS. For additional 
dominance and inequality index comparisons based on WVS data, see Jenkins (2019).
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(completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). The data are the same as those 
employed by Cowell and Flachaire (2017), though I analyze fewer countries. For 
more details about the data, see their paper and the WVS documentation (Inglehart 
et al., 2014). All my estimates use the WVS-supplied sample weights and were 
derived using my Stata program ineqord (Jenkins, 2020).7 Country-specific relative 
frequency distributions are shown in Appendix Figure A2.
Figure 2 shows the GL curves for two of the 15 possible pairwise cross-na-
tional comparisons. Panel (a) provides an example of inequality dominance: the 
GL curve for Britain lies every on or above the GL curve for South Africa, and 
hence life satisfaction inequality is lower in Britain than South Africa according 
to all indices J and D  ∈ , and there is more equality according to all indices 
belonging to . In contrast, panel (b) shows that there is no unambiguous ranking 
of Australia and New Zealand. Their GL curves intersect four times. To assess 
whether inequality is higher in one or other of these two countries requires use of 
indices and the ordering derived may depend on the index used.
Table  1 summarizes the results of all 15 pairwise GL curve comparisons 
(entries below the main diagonal) as well as for checks for first-order stochastic 
dominance (“F-dominance”) based on comparisons of cumulative distribution 
functions (entries above the main diagonal).8
GL curves do not cross in 8 out of 15 pairwise comparisons, demonstrating 
that the inequality dominance result has empirical usefulness. The most striking 
finding concerns South Africa: its life satisfaction inequality is unambiguously 
greater than in each of the other five countries. No country stands out as being 
unambiguously more equal than every other country, but Great Britain is more 
equal than its comparator countries in three of its five comparisons.
There is F-dominance in 8 of the 15 pairwise comparisons. For example, 
average life satisfaction in the USA is lower than in Canada, or Great Britain, or 
New Zealand, regardless of the life satisfaction scale that is used. However, the 
S-dominance criterion has little discriminatory power by comparison with the GL 
dominance criterion. There is only one case of S-dominance: there is greater spread 
away from the median in New Zealand than in Canada. S-dominance is rare partly 
because of the prevalence of F-dominance—if there is F-dominance, there can-
not also be S-dominance (Allison and Foster, 2004)—and partly because median 
life satisfaction is lower in South Africa than in the other countries (seven rather 
than eight). S-dominance applies only to distributions with a common median—a 
restriction that does not apply to GL-dominance.
To derive a complete inequality ordering of the six countries an inequality 
index must be used. However, different indices incorporate different social judge-
ments about how to assess differences in different parts of the life satisfaction dis-
tribution. It is, therefore, important to use a portfolio of indices to check the 
robustness of rankings. I report estimates for six GL-consistent indices in Figure 3: 
I(α) for α = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.9, plus J. For comparison, I also include 3 
S-dominance-consistent indices from the Abul Naga and Yalcin (2007) class. 
7The program can also be downloaded from within Stata using the command ssc install ineqord.
8See Appendix Figures A3 and A4 for charts showing all the pairwise GL curve and cumulative 
distribution function comparisons.
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ANY(1, 1) weights observations in categories above and below the median equally;9 
ANY(4, 1) is more sensitive to above-median spread than below-median spread; 
and ANY(1, 4) is the opposite (i.e. relatively bottom-sensitive). Figure  3 shows 
9For a linear integer scale, ANY(1,1) is also equal to Apouey’s (2007) P2(1) index. It is also known 
as the normalized average jump index.
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point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals. I estimate standard errors 
using a repeated half-sample bootstrap approach in order to appropriately account 
for the sample weights (Saigo et al., 2001; Van Kerm, 2013) with 500 bootstrap 
replications.
Consider the I(α) estimates. Figure  3 confirms that inequality is distinctly 
greater in South Africa than in every other country. For example, according to I(0), 
South Africa’s inequality is 4 percent larger than NZ’s (with the null hypothesis of 
no difference decisively rejected: test statistic = 5.2).10 According to I(0.9), the dif-
ference is 6 percent (test statistic = 4.8). Canada and Great Britain appear to have 
the lowest inequality according to all five I(α) estimates. (Although the I(0) point 
estimate appears slightly smaller for Canada, the CA-GB difference is not statisti-
cally different from zero.) The countries ranked second, third, and fourth by I(α) 
are NZ, the USA, and Australia, but differences between the three estimates are 
not statistically significant. (Differences between NZ on the one hand and Great 
Britain and Canada on the other hand are significantly different, however.) 
Rankings by J are very similar to those by I(α).
The bottom row of Figure 3 shows that median-based indices can yield dif-
ferent conclusions about inequality orderings from those based on GL-consistent 
indices. Although the country ranking by ANY(1,1) mimics those by I(0) and J, 
10The narrower confidence bands for South Africa’s estimates partly reflect that country’s dis-
tinctly larger WVS sample size (Jenkins, 2019).
Figure 3. Estimates of Life Satisfaction Inequality Across Countries: 9 Indices 
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the top- and bottom-sensitive indices ANY(4,1) and ANY(1,4) provide differ-
ent patterns. For example, according to these two indices, New Zealand is the 
second-ranked country by life satisfaction inequality after South Africa. For 
top-sensitive index ANY(4,1), Australia moves down the ranking by comparison 
with the rankings from the other indices. As well, the precision of the estimates of 
ANY(4,1) and ANY(1,4) seems to be lower than for the other indices: look at the 
width of the confidence intervals for South Africa and the USA in particular.
5. Generalized lorenz dominance and dual-H dominance compared
This section draws attention to differences between the GL dominance crite-
rion and the dual-H dominance criteria of Gravel et al. (2020). Gravel et al. build 
their approach on the principle that the inequality of an ordinal variable increases 
if  there is a shift in density mass away from a specific scale level (one person mov-
ing to a higher level as well as one moving to a lower level, where the number of 
levels changed by each person need not be the same). This is the concept of a dis-
equalizing “Hammond transfer,” which may be contrasted with the concept of a 
disequalizing Pigou-Dalton transfer for a cardinal variable such as income.11
Gravel et al. (2020) define H+ and H– curves (called H and H curves in their 
paper), the ordinates of which are specially defined recursive cumulations of CDFs 
over the levels of the ordinal variable from k = 1, …, K–1. The authors prove a dual 
dominance result: distribution A being more equal than distribution B according 
to the Hammond transfer concept is equivalent to (1) the H+ curve for A lying 
nowhere above the H+ curve for B, and (2) the H– curve for A lying nowhere above 
the H– curve for B. They also show that F-dominance implies H+ dominance. The 
dual dominance check can be applied if  the distributions have different medians.
Table 2 summarizes the results of H+-dominance and H–-dominance checks 
for each of the countries analyzed in the previous section, using the same format as 
Table 1.12 Entries above the diagonal refer to H+-dominance and entries below the 
diagonal to H–-dominance.
Table 2 shows that there are only four comparisons out of 15 for which there 
is dual-H dominance: according to this criterion, AU is more equal than ZA; US 
is more equal than ZA; CA is more equal than NZ; and GB is more equal than 
NZ. In all four cases, the pairwise ranking by the dual-H criteria coincides with 
the ranking by the GL dominance criterion (see Table 1). However, there are four 
additional rankings by the GL dominance criterion for which there is not dual 
H-dominance. (All of the eight country-pairs for which there is GL dominance are 
country-pairs for which there is H+-dominance.) For the remaining seven pairwise 
comparisons, there is neither GL nor dual H-dominance.
These comparisons demonstrate that Cowell-Flachaire (2017) and related indi-
ces such as J are not Hammond-transfer consistent in general. Another way of see-
ing this is to compare the social evaluation functions that correspond to the dual-H 
11Allison and Foster’s (2004) median-preserving spread is a specific example of a disequalizing 
Hammond transfer.
12See Appendix Figures 5 and 6 for charts showing all the pairwise comparisons.
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dominance criterion with ones associated with the GL dominance criterion. Gravel 
et al.’s (2020) Theorem 5 states that there is an equivalence between (1) distribution 
A dual-H dominating distribution B (i.e. A being more equal than B) and (2) the 
ranking of A over B by an additive social evaluation function defined as follows:13
for all lists of numbers (π1, …, πK) incorporating social evaluations of the levels 
that are increasing and “‘strongly concave’ with respect to [the] categories in the 
sense that the utility gain from moving from a category to a better one is always 
larger when moving from categories in the bottom of the scale than when moving 
in the upper part of it” (Gravel et al., 2020, p. 11). Specifically, the lists of numbers 
(π1, …, πK) must belong to the set , where:
14
Contrast the social evaluation function used in (5) with, for example, the class 
 defined in Section 2. Recall that indices E(α) = 1 – A(α), 0 ≤ α < 1, are members 
of . So too are:
13Equation (5) is a modification of Gravel et al.’s (2020) equation (6) to allow for different popula-
tion sizes in A and B. I also use different notation from them in order to be consistent with usage else-












































croSS-national compariSonS oF liFe SatiSFaction diStributionS: Summary oF dual H-dominance 
checkS
Country y
AU CA GB NZ US ZA
AU > > > > <
CA > < < < <
Country GB > < < < <
x NZ > > > < <
US > < < < <
ZA > < < < >
Notes: Entries above the diagonal summarize checks for H+-dominance: “<”, x’s H+ curve lies 
nowhere above y’s H+ curve; “>”, x’s H+ curve lies nowhere below y’s H+ curve; “–”, no dominance. 
Entries below the diagonal summarize checks for H–-dominance: “<”, x’s H– curve lies nowhere above 
y’s H– curve; “>”, x’s H– curve lies nowhere below y’s H– curve; “–”, no dominance. x dual-H dominates 
y if  x H+-dominates x and x H–-dominates y.
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Equation (7) highlights that the counterparts of the πk here are functions of 
Fk, the measure of status in the peer-inclusive downward-looking status case. These 
terms are non-decreasing in the scale levels (increasing if  there are responses for 
every level of the ordinal variable), but there is no guarantee that they are “strongly 
concave” with respect to the categories in the sense specified by (6) and required for 
consistency with dual-H dominance.
The differences between the GL dominance and dual-H dominance criteria 
relate to differences in the elementary transformations that characterize them. 
As explained earlier, the Cowell and Flachaire (2017) approach separates the 
measurement of inequality into two steps, the first being the definition of status 
(mapping the ordinal data about levels into a cardinal indicator), and the second 
being the summary of the dispersion of status across individuals. The elementary 
transformations associated with the GL dominance criterion refer to changes in 
individual status, and there is no reference to how these might arise in terms of 
shifts in the distribution of responses across scale levels. In particular, “distri-
bution A GL-dominates distribution B” is equivalent to “distribution A can be 
obtained from B by a finite sequence of either increases in individual status or 
status-mean-preserving progressive transfers of status (or both).” In contrast, the 
elementary transfers in the dual-H dominance approach refer to Hammond trans-
fers and these are defined with reference to changes in the spread of density mass 
across the scale levels. The constituent H+-dominance and H–-dominance criteria 
also refer to an “increment” and a “decrement,” that is, a shift of one person to a 
higher level or to a lower level, respectively. What matters for GL dominance is not 
these changes expressed in relation to levels but how they translate into changes in 
the distribution of status.
These points are illustrated using Table 3 which shows seven distributions of a 
four-level ordinal variable. (The table is modelled on Cowell and Flachaire’s (2017) 
Tables 2 and 3.) For each distribution, the top half  of the table shows the numbers 
of individuals (nk) at each level k = 1, …, 4, and their status (Fk), and the bottom 
half  shows the mean of status and inequality according to three GL-consistent 
indices.
Consider first a shift from Case 0 to Case 1, achieved by a promotion of 25 
individuals from level 3 to level 4, that is, a sequence of increments according 
to Gravel et al. (2020). Case 1 F-dominates Case 0: the shift represents a social 
improvement according to this criterion characterized with references to scale lev-
els. However, the shift from Case 0 to Case 1 also means that there is a decrease in 
status of ¼ for each of those who remain at level 3 (and average status falls), and 
Case 1 is GL-dominated by Case 0. That is, Case 1 represents a socially worse situ-
ation than Case 0 according to the GL criterion, and all GL-consistent inequality 
indices are greater for Case 1. A conflicting assessment by the F- and GL crite-
ria can also arise when mean status does not change. This is illustrated by a shift 
from Case 5 to Case 6. Case 5 F-dominates Case 6, but the shift downwards of 20 
individuals from level 4 to level 3 is associated with an increase in status for these 
movers. Case 6 GL-dominates Case 5, and the I(0.75), I(0), and J indices decrease.
Now consider the shift from Case 1 (uniform distribution) to Case 4. This 
is achieved by five individuals moving up from level 1 to level 2 and five moving 
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down from level 4 to level 3, and hence corresponding to a sequence of progressive 
Hammond transfers. There are multiple changes in status, for those who remain in 
the categories with movers as well as for the movers themselves. This is a situation 
where there is no GL dominance (nor F-dominance), and so whether there is a 
social improvement according to GL-consistent indices depends on the index cho-
sen. Inequality is lower for the uniform distribution (Case 1) than the non-uniform 
distribution (Case 4) according to I(0.75), but the reverse is the case according to 
I(0).
Conflicting conclusions need not arise. A shift from Case 0 to Case 2, achieved 
by the promotion of 25 individuals from level 1 to level 2, corresponds to an incre-
ment in both level space and status space. Case 2 F-dominates Case 0 and also 
GL-dominates it. The shift from Case 1 (a uniform distribution) to Case 2 rep-
resents a case without F-dominance but is achieved by a sequence of progressive 
Hammond transfers and hence a social improvement by the dual-H criterion. In 
addition, Case 1 is GL-dominated by Case 2. The shift from Case 0 to Case 3 is 
achieved by a promotion of 25 individuals from level 1 to level 2 (increasing their 
status by ¼) and a promotion of 25 individuals from level 3 to level 4 (decreasing 
the status of the level 3 stayers by ¼). This is a status-mean-preserving spread 
of status and so Case 3 is preferred according to the GL criterion. There is also 
F-dominance.
Finally, observe that the same distribution of status may correspond to very 
different distributions of individuals across the levels. Consider a seventh case (not 
shown in Table 3) of a four-level distribution in which 50 individuals respond with 
scale level 1 and 50 respond with level 4; and an eighth case (also not shown), in 
which 50 individuals respond with scale level 3 and 50 respond with level 4. The 
distributions of status are identical in both cases and yet, when moving from Case 
7 to Case 8, “inequality is unambiguously decreased on the space of the numerical 
labels” as a referee put it.
Part of the issue here concerns how inequality measures should account for 
situations in which some categories of the ordinal variable are empty. Cowell and 
Flachaire argue for what they call the mergers principle: “[i]f  two adjacent catego-
ries are merged, then this has no effect on the status of any person outside these 
two categories (2017, p. 293). Application of the principle leads to their peer-inclu-
sive and peer-exclusive status definitions, later combined with their downward- and 
upward-looking status concepts, and thence underpinning their inequality mea-
sures. The mergers principle means that, in Case 7, merging the two empty catego-
ries 2 and 3 and then, also merging this combined category with level 4 does not 
affect our assessment of the status of people in level 1. A counter-argument is that 
the social welfare gap between level 1 and level 4 is greater than the gap between 
level 3 and level 4—even if  we do not know how much larger because of the ordinal 
nature of the data—and that this should be taken into account by an inequality 
measure.
With reference to examples similar to those discussed above, a referee com-
mented that it is inappropriate to refer Cowell-Flachaire indices as “inequality” 
indices, also suggesting that the measures comprising E(α) are better described 
as social evaluation functions rather than as equality indices. The argument 
is that Cowell-Flachaire inequality indices always react positively not only to 
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status-mean-preserving progressive transfers of status (which is as one would 
expect) but also to increments in an individual’s status (which is arguably surpris-
ing). I believe that Cowell and Flachaire would demur. They argue that they pro-
vide “an alternative approach to inequality analysis that is rigorous, has a natural 
interpretation, and embeds both the ordinal data problem and the well-known car-
dinal data problem” (Cowell and Flachaire, 2017, p. 290). In doing so, they develop 
a particular approach to “inequality” which encapsulates the idea that “[w]hat is 
important in the ordinal data case is the pattern of individual moves towards or 
away from the reference point” (Cowell and Flachaire, 2017, p. 299). Put differ-
ently, Cowell and Flachaire are less concerned about embedding their approach 
to inequality within a broader framework of distributional comparisons based on 
social evaluation functions.
In sum, on the one hand and as the old saying goes, “you pays your money 
and you takes your choice” between the two approaches. On the other hand, 
and more positively, this paper has shown that it is straightforward to undertake 
analysis using both approaches. Where they yield different conclusions, research-
ers can investigate the sources of the differences by more detailed analysis of the 
distributions.
Currently missing from the analysis toolbox are indices that are guaranteed 
to be Hammond-transfer-consistent. Filling the gap requires specification of sets 
of πk values that satisfy Gravel et al.’s (2020) requirement that these numbers are 
increasing and strongly concave in the manner given by (6).
I now show that the index recently proposed by Apouey et al. (2020) only 
partially fits the bill. Their index is:15
ASX(γ) is increasing and concave in the levels of the ordered categorical 
variable. The γ parameter encapsulates aversion to inequality, with smaller values 
corresponding to greater aversion. The index reaches its minimum, 0, if  all indi-
viduals report the lowest level (k = 1) and it reaches its maximum, 1, if  all individ-
uals report the highest level (k = K). ASX(γ) = 0.5 when the distribution is totally 
polarized, regardless of γ. In the case of a uniform distribution, ASX(γ) = [(K – 1) 
– Kγ + γK]/[K(1 – γ – γK–1 + γK)] which ranges between 0.5, which is the limiting 
value as γ → 1, and (K – 1)/K which is the limiting value as γ → 0. That is, a uni-
form distribution is always socially preferred to the totally polarized distribution, 
regardless of the degree of inequality aversion—a result contrasting with the GL 
dominance ordering (see earlier). However, this social preference represents more 
than concern about inequality alone; there is an interplay with increasingness. By 
comparison with the polarized distribution, the higher levels achieved by some in 
the uniform distribution more than offset the lower levels achieved by others. For 
15My statement of the ASX() index differs from that in Proposition 3 of Apouey et al. (2020, 
p. 274) because I use the conventional labelling scheme in which k = 1 refers to the worst category and 










Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2019
16
© 2020 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
the same reason, if  every individual reports level K, ASX(γ) takes a larger value 
than in a situation in which every individual reports level k < K. In sum, ASX(γ) 
is an index of the “social welfare” associated with an ordinal distribution, not an 
index of inequality alone.
In addition, there is no guarantee that ASX(γ) is always Hammond-transfer-
consistent in the sense of Gravel et al. (2020). From (6), if  K = 3, the only relevant 
condition is (π2 – π1) ≥ (π3 – π2), which is satisfied for all γ. If  K = 4, there are four 
conditions that need to be satisfied. Three are satisfied but the condition (π2 – π1) ≥ 
(π4 – π2) holds only if  γ < γ* where threshold γ* ≈ 0.62. When K = 5, there are 
more conditions and (π2 – π1) ≥ (π5 – π2) holds only if  γ < γ* with γ* ≈ 0.55. As K 
increases further, Hammond-transfer-consistency requires smaller and smaller γ*. 
In other words, consistency is guaranteed only if  the degree of inequality aversion 
is sufficiently great and this ensures the “strong concavity” that Gravel et al. (2020) 
refer to. This result arises because Apouey et al.’s Equity Principle is a weaker 
requirement than Gravel et al.’s: it “requires the existence of … a ‘locally inequal-
ity-reduced’ achievement vector that is ranked higher than the initial achievement 
vector, while Hammond’s equity principle insists on any locally inequality-reduced 
achievement vector being ranked higher than the initial achievement vector” 
(Apouey et al., 2020, p. 272. Emphasis in original).
6. Summary and concluSionS
Cowell and Flachaire’s (2017) approach to inequality measurement with 
ordinal data complements the predominant approach to date that conceptual-
izes greater inequality as greater spread around the median. This paper builds on 
Cowell and Flachaire’s work by adding dominance results and a new inequality 
index. I show that non-intersection of appropriately defined GL curves is equiv-
alent to a unanimous ordering of distributions according to all Cowell-Flachaire 
(2017) inequality indices and the new index based on GL curve areas. In contrast 
with S-dominance, the results presented here can be applied when distributions 
do not have a common median. Cross-national comparisons based on WVS data 
show that the GL curve-based results have useful empirical content in the sense of 
revealing a substantial number of unanimous rankings.
I have also discussed how the GL-dominance criterion discussed here differs 
from the dual H-dominance criteria developed by Gravel et al. (2020) which relate 
to the Hammond transfer principle. It is clear that comparisons of distributions of 
ordinal data expressed in terms of numbers of individuals with different levels of 
“status” differ fundamentally from comparisons based on distributions expressed 
in terms of numbers of individuals at different scale levels.
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